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LAVIEAPRÈS L’AVIS: EXPLORINGTHE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL
(YET NOT BLIND) TRUST
KOEN LENAERTS*
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to highlight the fact that, whilst the autonomy
of the EU legal order requires that the principle of mutual trust should be
afforded constitutional status, as was held in Opinion 2/13, that principle
is by no means absolute. In cases such as N.S. and Aranyosi and
Ca˘lda˘raru, the ECJ has made clear that mutual trust must not be confused
with blind trust. Trust must be “earned” by the Member State of origin
through effective compliance with EU fundamental rights standards.
However, where EU legislation is found to comply with the Charter, any
limitations on the principle of mutual trust must remain exceptional and
should operate in such a way as to restore that trust as soon as possible,
thereby reinforcing both the protection of fundamental rights and mutual
trust as the cornerstones of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
1. Introduction
Many commentators have expressed disappointment since, in late 2014, the
ECJ issued its Opinion 2/131 finding that the draft international agreement
(draft agreement) by which the EU was to accede to the European Convention
on Human Rights was, as it stood, incompatible with the EU legal order.2
* President of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Professor of European Union
Law, Leuven University. All opinions expressed herein are personal to the author.
1. Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454.
2. See e.g. Peers, “The EU’s accession to the ECHR: The dream becomes a nightmare”, 16
GLJ (2015), 213–222; Spaventa, “A very fearful Court?”, 22 MJ (2015), 35–56; Jacqué,
“L’avis 2/13 CJUE. Non à l’adhésion à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme?”,
(2014) Droit de l’Union européenne, at <www.droit-union-europeenne.be/412337458>. Cf.
Halberstam, “‘It’s the autonomy, stupid!’A modest defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to
the ECHR, and the way forward”, 16 GLJ (2015), 105–146; Picod, “La Cour de justice a dit non
à l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention EDH. – Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien,
selon les sages du plateau du Kirchberg”, (2015) Semaine Juridique Edition Générale;
Malenovský, “Comment tirer parti de l’avis 2/13 de la Cour de l’Union européenne sur
l’adhésion à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme”, (2015) R.G.D.I.P., 705–742.
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A number of objections have been raised in respect of the ECJ’s ruling but
the part of the Opinion that has probably attracted the most criticism is the
passage where the ECJ held that the draft agreement contained no provisions
accommodating the principle of mutual trust, a constitutional principle that
defines the legal structure of the EU as a Union of values that are commonly
shared by its Member States.3 In that passage of Opinion 2/13, the ECJ wrote
that “[the] approach adopted in the [draft agreement failed] to take into
consideration the fact that the Member States have, by reason of their
membership of the EU, accepted that relations between them as regards the
matters covered by [the EU Treaties] are governed by EU law to the exclusion,
if EU law so requires, of any other law”.4 This was because the ECHR would
require “the EU and the Member States to be considered Contracting Parties
not only in their relations with Contracting Parties which are not Member
States of the EU but also in their relations with each other, including where
such relations are governed by EU law”. This would mean that “a Member
State [would be required] to check that another Member State has observed
fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust
between those Member States”. Accordingly, as envisaged by the draft
agreement, “accession [to the ECHR was] liable to upset the underlying
balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law”.5
In the view of some scholars, that passage implies that the ECJ accorded
greater value to the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition between
Member State courts and legal systems than it did to fundamental rights
themselves.6 Whilst it is possible to understand those criticisms up to a point,
this contribution does not subscribe to that reading of Opinion 2/13. This is
because, as interpreted by the ECJ, mutual trust must not be confused with
blind trust.7 This means, in essence, that it is possible to accommodate that
principle with a level of fundamental rights protection that, whilst preserving
3. Opinion 2/13, para 168.
4. Ibid., para 193.
5. Ibid., para 194.
6. See e.g. Peers, op. cit. supra note 2, at 221 (holding that “… for JHA in particular,
the Treaty drafters provided in Article 67(1) TFEU that the EU must ‘constitute an area of
freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights’. The Treaty does not give
priority to mutual trust over human rights – quite the opposite”). In the same way, see Eeckhout,
“Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR and judicial dialogue: Autonomy or autarky”, 38
Fordham International Law Journal (2015), 970. See also Spaventa, op. cit. supra note 2, at 52
(who argues that since “there is no effective way to monitor fundamental rights compliance in
the EU”, “mutual trust [should not] be elevated to a ‘supreme’ interest/principle in human
rights-sensitive areas”).
7. Bay Larsen, “Some reflections on mutual recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice” in Cardonnel, Rosas and Wahl (Eds.),Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System:
Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh (Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 140. See also Prechal, “Mutual
trust before the Court of Justice of the European Union”,European Papers (2017, forthcoming)
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the autonomy of the EU legal order, draws inspiration from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States and the ECHR. In that regard, the
“autonomy” put forward in Opinion 2/13 does not refer to plain detachment.
On the contrary, when it comes to protecting fundamental rights, the ECJ
seeks to define the EU constitutional space without denying that EU law
influences, and is influenced by, the legal orders that surround it.
The purpose of this contribution is thus to explore the principle of mutual
trust as applied in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). It is
divided into three sections. Section 2 is devoted to examining the
constitutional basis for the principle of mutual trust. It is submitted that as a
constitutional principle, mutual trust is founded on the principle of “equality
of Member States before the law” enshrined in Article 4(2) TEU. Section 3
looks at the normative content of mutual trust from which two negative
obligations may be inferred, first, that a Member State may not demand a
higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another
Member State than that provided by EU law, and, second, that a Member State
is, in principle, precluded from second-guessing whether another Member
State complies with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(the Charter).8 In Section 4, it is argued that Opinion 2/13 must not be read as
a sign of mistrust towards the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),
since that court has itself acknowledged the importance of the principle of
mutual trust in the EU legal order.9 Most importantly, the principle of mutual
trust allows room for national public policy and European public policy
exceptions to the mutual recognition of judgments, thus showing that that
principle is by no means absolute. Finally, a brief conclusion supports the
contention that, whilst the autonomy of the EU legal order requires that the
principle of mutual trust should be afforded constitutional status, the contours
of that principle are not carved in stone, but will take concrete shape by means
of a constructive dialogue between the ECJ, the ECtHR and national courts.
2. The principle of equality before the Treaties
The EU is founded on the basic idea that its citizens are equal under the
Treaties. There is nothing more repugnant to the values on which the EU is
founded than to assert that some EU citizens are superior to others, or, as
andAnagnostaras, “Mutual confidence is not blind trust! Fundamental rights protection and the
execution of the European arrest warrant: Aranyosi and Caldararu”, 53 CML Rev. (2016),
1675–1704.
8. See Lenaerts, “The principle of mutual recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice”, (2015) Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 530.
9. ECtHR, Avotin¸š v. Latvia, Appl. No. 17502/07, judgment of 23 May 2016.
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George Orwell had it in his celebrated allegorical novel, Animal Farm, that
some aremore equal than others.10 This applies not only to EU citizens in their
individual capacity, but also to the Member States, as the entities through
which EU citizens collectively exercise their democratic rights. In the EU
legal order, the principle of equality is thus both a fundamental right, when
applied to individuals, and a principle of governance, when applied to the
Member States.
As regards that principle of governance, Article 4(2) TEU provides that
“[t]he EU shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties”.
Within the scope of application of EU law, the Member States stand on an
equal footing. Regardless of their date of accession, of their size, of their
economic power, of their history, of their system of government, all Member
States enjoy the same democratic legitimacy, as they are equally committed to
the value of democracy on which the EU is based. The EU is thus precluded
from considering that some national democracies and the choices that they
make are better than others. In the same way, the principle of equality of
Member States before the Treaties means that all Member States are equally
committed to upholding the rule of law within the EU, of which fundamental
rights are part and parcel.11 In particular, all national courts, and especially all
national supreme and constitutional courts, are under the same obligation to
guarantee effective judicial protection to the rights guaranteed by EU law.
The principle of equality of Member States before the Treaties is, in my
view, the constitutional basis for the principle of mutual trust in the EU legal
order.12 As the ECJ wrote in its Opinion 2/13, since the legal structure of the
EU is founded on the premise that “each Member State shares with all the
other Member States, and recognizes that they share with it, a set of common
values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU”, “[t]hat
premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the
Member States that those values will be recognized and, therefore, that the law
of the EU that implements them will be respected”.13 Given that all Member
States are deemed to share the same degree of commitment to democratic
values, fundamental rights and the rule of law, one may reasonably expect that
10. Orwell, Animal Farm (Secker & Warburg, 1945).
11. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate of 16 Sept. 2016, 2 BvR
890/16, discussed infra.
12. It appears that the Full Faith and Credit Clause laid down in Article IV of the US
Constitution has a similar constitutional basis. See in this regard Sedler, “Constitutional
limitations on choice of law: The perspective of constitutional generalism”, 10 Hofstra Law
Review (1981), 97 (who posits that “[r]ead together, the provisions of [A]rticle IV and the
historical circumstances surrounding their adoption, seem to indicate quite clearly that
the broad, organic purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to promote equality among the
states and respect for the sovereignty of each state in the federal system”).
13. Opinion 2/13, para 168.
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they should trust each other, especially when acting in concert to achieve
common EU objectives.14
In that regard, drawing a distinction between the principle of equality of
Member States before the Treaties and the public international law principle
of sovereign equality may help to illustrate this point. As mentioned above,
within the scope of EU law, the relations between the EU Member States are
based on the premise that all Member States are equally committed to
upholding the common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article
2 TEU. By contrast, outside the scope of EU law, the relations between the EU
Member States and any third country are governed by public international law,
including the principle of sovereign equality. That principle confers on every
sovereign State an equal capacity to enter into international obligations but is
silent as to whether States share a set of common values. Thus, whilst EU
Member States are, in principle, to be considered equals before the law of the
EU by virtue of the set of common values that they share, the same does not
hold true as regards an EU Member State and a third country. An EU Member
State and a third country may be equals before international law, but they are
not equals before the law of the EU as only the former is part of the EU,
understood as a Union of values. That explains why the ECJ, approaching the
problem from the standpoint of EU law – as it was bound to do – criticized
the fact that the draft agreement contained no provision distinguishing the
relations between EU Member States (in situations governed by EU law) and
those between EU Member States and other Contracting Parties to the
ECHR.15
As applied to the objective of creating and maintaining an area where EU
citizens may move freely and securely without internal frontiers, the principle
of mutual trust is “of fundamental importance”16 since it guarantees that the
exercise of free movement does not undermine the effectiveness of the
decisions adopted by the competent Member State (whose public power is
often exercised on a territorial basis). As internal borders disappear, the
principle of mutual trust enables the arm of the law to become longer by
acquiring a transnational reach. In setting up the AFSJ, judicial dialogue and
comity among national judiciaries was seen by the authors of the Treaties as
the appropriate means for the establishment and proper functioning of the
AFSJ. The authors of the Treaties took the view that national courts were best
placed to protect the fundamental rights of individuals as they are insulated
from political considerations and are, in cooperation with the ECJ, entrusted
with the task of upholding the rule of law within the EU. That is why the
14. Ibid., paras. 168–169.
15. Ibid., para 194.
16. Ibid., para 191.
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establishment of such an area is, first and foremost, to be achieved through the
mutual recognition of national judicial decisions. Mutual recognition of those
decisions implies that the court where recognition and enforcement is sought
should trust that the court that adopted the decision in question provided
effective judicial protection to the persons concerned by that decision,
including, above all, protection of their fundamental rights.17
The principle of mutual recognition means that judicial decisions – issued
by the competent court and that fall within the scope of the relevant EU
legislation – must be recognized and enforced throughout the EU.18 In
favouring the effectiveness – in cross-border situations – of national judicial
decisions in civil or criminal matters that may involve the application of
coercive measures, such as a judicial decision ordering the return of a child or
a European arrest warrant (EAW), the principle of mutual recognition
contributes to the effective exercise of public power by the Member States.
That is so regardless of whether that exercise of public power serves to protect
public or private interests.
However, in enhancing the achievement of that objective, that principle
inevitably has a negative impact on the exercise of fundamental rights in
certain situations.19 For example, the competent court under the Brussels II a
Regulation may order a parent who has removed a child from his or her
Member State of habitual residence to return the child to that Member State,
thus placing a constraint on that parent’s right to a family life.20 Similarly, a
person who is the subject of an EAW may be surrendered to the Member State
17. See in that regard Case C-452/16 PPU,Poltorak, EU:C:2016:858, paras. 44–45 (holding
that “[t]he principle of mutual recognition …, is founded on the premise that a judicial authority
has intervened prior to the execution of the European arrest warrant, for the purposes of
exercising its review. However, the issue of an arrest warrant by a non-judicial authority, such as
a police service, does not provide the executing judicial authority with an assurance that the
issue of that European arrest warrant has undergone such judicial approval and cannot,
therefore, suffice to justify the high level of [trust] between the Member States, … which forms
the very basis of the [European Arrest Warrant] Framework Decision”). In the same vein, see
Case C-477/16 PPU, Kovalkovas, EU:C:2016:861, paras. 43–44 and Case C-453/16 PPU,
Özçelik, EU:C:2016:860, para 32.
18. Thus, for present purposes, the principle of mutual recognition focuses on the
recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, rather than on the law that applies to the
adoption of those decisions (conflict of laws).
19. The cross-border application of the principle of ne bis in idem is, however, a notable
exception. See Bribosia and Weyembergh, “Confiance mutuelle et droits fondamentaux: «Back
to the future»”, (2016) CDE, 480.
20. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 (Brussels II a Regulation) of 27 Nov. 2003
concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial
matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1347/2000,
O.J. 2003, L 338/1.
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that issued such an EAW against his or her will, thus limiting that person’s
freedom.
That is why the principle of mutual recognition in the AFSJ is subject to
strict conditions and limits.21 Limitations on the exercise of fundamental
rights must, in accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, be “provided for
by law” and the operation of that principle therefore depends on the adoption
of legislative acts at EU level, meaning that only the EU legislative institutions
may give concrete expression to the principle of mutual recognition.
Consequently, judicial intervention at the behest of litigants is no remedy for
legislative inaction on the part of the EU institutions. It is thus for the EU
legislative institutions to adopt the measures required to ensure that the
principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions is applied in a manner
that takes due account of the essence of the rights and freedoms recognized by
the Charter, and complies with the principle of proportionality. In the AFSJ,
EU legislative measures that prescribe the mutual recognition of judicial
decisions are therefore accompanied by “trust-enhancing legislation”. In
particular, in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the EU
legislative institutions have established minimum rules concerning the rights
of individuals in criminal procedures22 and of victims of crime.23 By creating
a “level playing field” as regards those rights, the EU legislative institutions
sought to facilitate the free movement of judicial decisions. They rightly
believed that a Member State would be more willing to recognize and enforce
decisions issued in other Member States if the fundamental rights of the
person(s) concerned were properly protected throughout the EU. This shows
that, whilst the principle of mutual trust is embedded in the constitutional
fabric of the EU, it is for the EU legislative institutions to strengthen that trust
21. See Möstl, “Preconditions and limits of mutual recognition”, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 405
and Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Law (OUP, 2013). Cf.
Frackowiak-Adamska, “Time for a European ‘Full Faith and Credit Clause’”, 52 CML Rev.
(2015), 211–212.
22. See Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 Oct.
2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, O.J. 2010, L 280/1;
Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the
right to information in criminal proceedings, O.J. 2012, L 142/1; Directive 2013/48/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 Oct. 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in
criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a
third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and
with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, O.J. 2013, L 294/1, and Directive
2016/343/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 Mar. 2016 on the
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present
at the trial in criminal proceedings, O.J. 2016, L 65/1.
23. See Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oct.
2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime,
and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, O.J. 2012, L 315/57.
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by laying down a common body of basic procedural rights that are conferred
on the persons concerned by the free movement of judicial decisions.
The role of the ECJ is then to interpret the EU legislative acts that shape the
principle of mutual recognition and give concrete expression to basic
procedural rights, and to ensure their compatibility with fundamental rights as
recognized in the Charter: secondary EU legislation that seeks to facilitate the
mutual recognition of judicial decisions in civil or criminal matters must
indeed respect the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter. Similarly,
trust-enhancing legislation must define those basic procedural rights in a
manner that is consistent with the Charter. As a result, the ECJ acts as the
guarantor of fundamental rights in this field, operating as a constitutional
check on the EU political process.
To sum up: it is because Member States, and particularly their national
courts, are deemed equal before the Treaties that they are able to trust each
other to protect fundamental rights adequately and it is because they trust each
other that judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters is feasible, through
the mutual recognition of judicial decisions. The successful operation of the
principle of mutual recognition is thus based on the assumption that Member
States can – and do – trust each other as regards respect for fundamental rights.
3. The normative content of the principle of mutual trust
In Opinion 2/13, the ECJ highlighted the importance of mutual trust in the
AFSJ. This is not, however, something new. For example, in Brügge, the ECJ
held that the operation of the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 54
of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) required
“the Member States [to] have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems”.24
Likewise, in Rinau, a child abduction case relating to the interpretation of the
Brussels II aRegulation,25 the ECJ held that “[that] Regulation is based on the
idea that the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in a Member
State must be based on the principle of mutual trust and the grounds for
non-recognition must be kept to the minimum required”.26 Most importantly,
in N.S., an asylum case concerning the Dublin II Regulation (now repealed
and replaced by the Dublin III Regulation),27 the ECJ held that “the raison
d’être of the European Union and the creation of an [AFSJ are] based on
24. Joined Cases C-187 and 385/01, Gözütok and Brügge, EU:C:2003:87, para 33.
25. Brussels II a Regulation, cited supra note 20.
26. Case C-195/08 PPU, Rinau, EU:C:2008:406, para 50.
27. Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 Feb. 2003 establishing the criteria and
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, O.J. 2003, L 50/1.
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mutual [trust] and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with
[EU] law and, in particular, fundamental rights”.28 What is interesting about
the N.S. judgment is that the ECJ did not ground the principle of mutual trust
in the particular context of the Dublin System, but qualified it as a
constitutional principle. Opinion 2/13 confirmed that approach: the principle
of mutual trust is a constitutional principle that pervades the entire AFSJ.
However, the fact remains that the “principle of mutual trust” is not defined
in the Treaties.29 Some scholars have posited that that principle is not (or at
least not yet) amenable to judicial review.30 In their view, it is a constitutional
axiom that must inspire legislative action at EU level, but does not give rise to
judicially enforceable standards. That being said, Opinion 2/13 might suggest
otherwise. Drawing on its previous rulings in N.S. and Melloni,31 the ECJ
provided a definition of the principle of mutual trust. That passage of the
Opinion merits quotation in full:
“That principle requires, particularly with regard to the [AFSJ], each of
[the Member] States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the
other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with
the fundamental rights recognized by EU law.”32
In the light of that definition of the principle of mutual trust, the ECJ inferred
that the Member States, when implementing EU law, are required to presume
that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States. That
presumption imposes two negative obligations on the Member States.33 First,
they may “not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental
rights from another Member State than that provided by EU law”.34 Second,
“save in exceptional cases”, Member States are prevented from “check[ing]
whether [another] Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU”.35
Repealed by Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 June 2013 (recast), O.J. 2013, L 180/31.
28. Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S., EU:C:2011:865, para 83. The expressions “mutual
trust” and “mutual confidence” are interchangeable (in French, both those expressions are
translated as “confiance mutuelle”).
29. Prechal, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1.
30. Herlin-Karnell, “Constitutional principles in the EU Area of Freedom, Security an
Justice” in Acosta and Murphy (Eds.), EU Security and Justice Law (Hart Publishing, 2014),
p. 36; Prechal, op. cit. supra note 7, at 20.
31. Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S., paras. 78–80, and Case C-399/11, Melloni,
EU:C:2013:107, paras. 37 and 63.
32. Opinion 2/13, para 191.
33. See Lenaerts, op. cit. supra note 8, at 530; Prechal, op. cit. supra note 7, at 9.
34. Opinion 2/13, para 192.
35. Ibid.
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Whilst the first obligation allows no room for exceptions, the second does.
This point is examined more closely by reference to recent case law of the
ECJ, notably in the context of the Framework Decision on the European arrest
warrant (the EAW Framework Decision).36
As the “cornerstone” of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the EAW
Framework Decision aims to replace the multilateral system of extradition
between Member States, which was often politically driven, with a system of
surrender that rests solely in the hands of judicial authorities.37 Accordingly,
the surrender of those convicted of crimes, for the purpose of enforcing
judgments, or that of criminal suspects, for the purpose of conducting
prosecutions, is based on the principle of mutual recognition of judicial
decisions. That principle implies that “the Member States are in principle
obliged to act upon [an EAW]”.38 In the same way, theymust refuse to execute
such an EAW only in the cases of mandatory non-execution provided for in
Article 3 of the EAW Framework Decision andmay do so only in the cases of
optional non-execution listed in Articles 4 and 4a thereof. In addition, the only
conditions to which the executing judicial authority may make the execution
of an EAW subject are those set out in Article 5 of the EAW Framework
Decision. This means that, under the EAW Framework Decision, the primary
responsibility for protecting the fundamental rights of persons who are the
subject of an EAW rests with the judicial authorities of the issuing Member
State, i.e. the Member State where criminal proceedings are taking – or have
taken – place.
It follows that the executing judicial authority may not make the execution
of an EAW conditional upon compliance with the level of fundamental rights
protection provided for by its own constitution where that level is higher than
that provided for by EU law. Otherwise, the principle of equality of Member
States before the Treaties would be undermined. In the eyes of EU law, it is
impossible both to consider all Member States to be equally committed to
upholding fundamental rights, and yet at the same time to allow the executing
Member State to impose its own constitutional standards on the issuing
Member State, where the latter Member State has complied with EU law. Any
such imposition would be the beginning of the end for the principle of mutual
trust.
36. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, O.J. 2002, L 190/1 (as amended
by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 Feb. 2009, O.J. 2009, L 81/24).
37. See Case C-192/12 PPU,West, EU:C:2012:404, para 54; Case C-399/11,Melloni, para
36, Case C-168/13 PPU, F., EU:C:2013:358, para 34 and Case C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan,
EU:C:2015:474, para 27.
38. Case C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan, para 36 and case law cited previous footnote.
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Of course, there can be situations in which EU law leaves room for value
diversity, either because there is no EU legislation governing the particular
situation39 or because EU legislation that does exist fails to provide a uniform
level of fundamental rights protection.40 When implementing those
provisions of the EAW Framework Decision that do not set out such a uniform
level of protection, the issuing Member State may apply its own standards,
provided that those standards are at least equal to the level of protection
provided for by the Charter and that “the primacy, unity and effectiveness of
[EU] law are not compromised”.41
The same applies to the executing Member State. The ruling of the ECJ in
F. and that of the German Constitutional Court in Mr C. v. Order of the
Kammergericht illustrate that point.
Before looking at the F. case, it is worth recalling that the EU legislative
institutions decided that the issuing of an EAW must comply with the
principle of speciality.42 This means that an EAW may only be executed in
respect of the offences listed therein. If the issuing judicial authority wishes to
prosecute the person surrendered for offences other than those for which that
person has been surrendered, that authority must make a request to the
executing judicial authority, which must adopt a decision agreeing to it.
However, the executing judicial authority must or may refuse to consent, or
may make consent subject to conditions, only in the cases listed in Articles 3
to 5 of the EAW Framework Decision.43
Thus, in F., the question was whether the EAW Framework Decision had to
be interpreted as precluding the executing Member State from providing for a
constitutional right which would enable the person concerned to bring an
appeal having suspensive effect against a decision agreeing to such a request.
The ECJ held that the EAW Framework Decision read in the light of the
Charter neither imposed nor precluded such a right of appeal.44 As a
consequence, it was for each Member State to decide whether its
constitutional law permitted the national legislature to provide for such an
39. Joined Cases C-483/09 & 1/10,Gueye, EU:C:2011:583. See also Lamont, annotation of
Joined Cases C-483/09 & C-1/10, Gueye and Salmerón Sánchez, 49 CML Rev. (2012), 1455
(holding “that the procedural guarantees of the Framework Decision [on the standing of victims
in criminal proceedings do not affect the substantive national law on penalties, nor do they
disrupt the policy choices made by national law to combat violence in the family”).
40. As well as Case C-168/13 PPU, F., a good example outside the AFSJ is provided by
Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105.
41. See e.g. Case C-399/11,Melloni, para 60.
42. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, cited supra note 36, Art. 27.
43. Case C-168/13 PPU, F., para 36. See Millet, “How much lenience for how much
cooperation? On the first preliminary reference of the French Constitutional Council to the
Court of Justice”, 51 CML Rev. (2014), 195–218.
44. Case C-168/13 PPU, F, paras. 44 and 52.
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appeal. In making provision for such an appeal the national legislature could
not, however, call into question the system of mutual recognition set out in the
EAW Framework Decision. This meant, in particular, that the appeal should
not prevent the executing judicial authority from adopting a decision within
the time-limits prescribed by the EAW Framework Decision.45
In the same way, in Mr C. v. Order of the Kammergericht,46 the German
Constitutional Court held that the Basic Law did not preclude the execution of
an EAW issued by a UK court, despite the fact that the right to remain silent is
not protected in the same way in the UK as in Germany. In the UK, the right to
remain silent may be limited in that the trial court or jury may draw an
adverse inference from an accused’s failure to give evidence or his refusal,
without good cause, to answer any questions.47 In that regard, the German
Constitutional Court ruled that only where the core (the so-called
“Kerngehalt”) of the accused’s right to remain silent (as provided for in Art.
1(1) of the Basic Law, a constitutional provision protecting human dignity as
part of Germany’s constitutional identity) is adversely affected will German
courts refuse to execute an EAW.48 However, since UK law provided that a
conviction could not be solely or mainly based on the accused’s refusal to give
evidence or to answer questions or on the very fact of his silence, the German
Constitutional Court found that neither Article 1(1) of the Basic Law nor the
right to a fair trial as recognized in Article 6 ECHR49 – a right enshrined in
Article 47(2) of the Charter – precluded that limitation. From the perspective
of the Basic Law, the Kammergericht was right to execute the EAW in
question.
It follows that the German Constitutional Court decided not to impose its
own fundamental rights standards on the issuing judicial authority, opting
instead for an approach that took account of the principle of equality of
Member States before EU law by recognizing the legitimacy of the choices
made by the UK in respect of the right to remain silent. It thus reinforced the
principle of mutual trust by embracing value diversity between the Member
States which was possible in this instance because the EU legislative
45. Ibid., para 65.
46. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 890/16, cited supra note 11.
47. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, para 35.
48. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 890/16, cited supra note 11, para 36.
49. Ibid., paras. 41–42. To that end, that court referred to ECtHR, Murray v. United
Kingdom, Appl. No. 14310/88, judgment of 8 Feb. 1996, paras. 44 et seq.; ECtHR, Condron v.
United Kingdom, Appl. No. 35718/97, judgment of 2 May 2000, paras. 55 et seq.; ECtHR,
Beckles v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 44652/98, judgment of 8 Oct. 2002, paras. 57 et seq.;
ECtHR, O’Donnell v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 16667/10, judgment of 7 Apr. 2015, paras.
48 et seq.
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institutions had not defined the right to remain silent.50 That said, as the ECJ
held in F., the scope of diversity is limited in that it must comply with the
Charter, whose interpretation draws inspiration from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States and the ECHR when determining the
contours of the right to remain silent, thereby ensuring normative convergence
on the same basic standard of protection.
Conversely, when implementing the provisions of the EAW Framework
Decision that do set out a uniform level of fundamental rights protection, the
judicial authority must meet that level when issuing an EAW. Moreover, if that
level is complied with, the executing judicial authority may not deny
execution. Needless to say, the uniform level of protection provided for by the
EAW Framework Decision must be compatible with the Charter.
Since the EU judiciary enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to examine the validity
of secondary EU law, it is not for national courts to undertake such an
examination. Where doubts arise as to the compatibility of the EAW
Framework Decision with the Charter, those courts are obliged to make a
reference to the ECJ. In fact, that is precisely what the Belgian Constitutional
Court did in Advocaten voor de Wereld and I.B.,51 and the Spanish
Constitutional Court inMelloni. In those cases, the referring courts each asked
the ECJ to determine whether different aspects of the EAW Framework
Decision complied with the fundamental rights recognized by the EU legal
order.
InMelloni, the Spanish Constitutional Court asked the ECJ whether Article
4a(1) of the EAW Framework Decision, as amended by Framework Decision
2009/299,52 was compatible with Articles 47 and 48(2) of the Charter. In
2009, the EU legislative institutions amended the EAW Framework Decision
with a view to protecting the procedural rights of persons subject to criminal
proceedings whilst improving mutual recognition of judicial decisions
between Member States. To that effect, Article 4a(1) lists the circumstances
under which the executing judicial authority may not refuse execution of an
50. Note that the EU legislative institutions have now laid down common minimum rules
concerning the right to remain silent. See Directive 2016/343/EU, cited supra note 22, Art. 7
entitled “Right to remain silent and right not to incriminate oneself ”. For a comment on that
provision, see Cras and Erbeznik, “The Directive on the presumption of innocence and the right
to be present at trial”, (2016) Eucrim, 31. However, Directive 2016/343/EU does not apply to
the UK: see Recital (50) of that Directive.
51. Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, EU:C:2007:261, and Case C-306/09, I.B.,
EU:C:2010:626.
52. Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 Feb. 2009 amending Framework
Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA,
thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle
of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial,
O.J. 2009, L 81/24.
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EAW issued against a person convicted in absentia. In particular, it states that
execution of a decision rendered in absentia may not be refused where the
person concerned, first, was aware of the trial that had been scheduled, second,
instructed legal counsel to act in his or her defence and, third, was in fact
represented by that counsel at the trial.
At the outset, drawing on the relevant case law of the ECtHR, the ECJ found
that “[the right to a fair trial] is not absolute” but “[the] accused may waive that
right of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, provided that the waiver
is established in an unequivocal manner, is attended by minimum safeguards
commensurate to its importance and does not run counter to any important
public interest”.53 In setting the level of fundamental rights protection of the
persons convicted in absentia, the EU legislative institutions had respected
those features of the right to a fair trial and had thus acted in compliance with
the Charter.54 Indeed, Article 4a(1) only requires execution of an EAW in the
absence of a retrial in cases where persons convicted in absentia have
voluntarily and unambiguously waived their right to be present at the trial in
the issuing Member State.55 Conversely, where such a waiver cannot be either
explicitly or implicitly deduced from the individual’s words or conduct,
Article 4a(1) states that execution may be refused unless a retrial “which
allows the merits of the case, including fresh evidence, to be re-examined, and
which may lead to the original decision being reversed” takes place in the
issuing Member State.
In the case at hand, the existence of such a waiver meant that the Spanish
Constitutional Court could not apply its own case law under Article 24 of the
Spanish Constitution, according to which a retrial was always required,56 and
therefore that court decided to revisit it.57 It held that in the context of the EAW
Framework Decision the content of the right to a fair trial does not include all
the guarantees enshrined in the Spanish Constitution, but only those that
53. Case C-399/11,Melloni, para 49. See de Boer, “Addressing rights divergences under the
Charter:Melloni”, 50 CML Rev. (2013): 1083–1103.
54. Case C-399/11,Melloni, para 50 (holding that “[t]his interpretation of Articles 47 and
48(2) of the Charter is in keeping with the scope that has been recognized for the rights
guaranteed by Article 6(1) and (3) of the ECHR by the case-law of the [ECtHR]” and citing
ECtHR, Medenica v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 20491/92, judgment of 14 June 2001, paras.
56–59; ECtHR, Sejdovic v. Italy, Appl. No. 56581/00, judgment of 1 Mar. 2006, paras. 84, 86
and 98, and ECtHR, Haralampiev v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 29648/03, judgment of 24 Apr. 2012,
paras. 32–33). In that regard, it is also worth looking at Art. 8 of Directive 2016/343/EU, cited
supra note 22, entitled “Right to be present at the trial”, read in the light of Recitals 33 to 43 of
that Directive. For a comment on that provision, see Cras and Erbeznik, op. cit. supra note 50,
at 33.
55. Case C-399/11,Melloni, paras. 52–54.
56. Ibid., para 63.
57. Tribunal Constitucional, judgment of 13 Feb. 2014.
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constitute the very essence of that right. Accordingly, it reasoned that, when
Spanish courts are requested to execute an EAW, the content of the right to a
fair trial is to be determined in the light of the international treaties to which
Spain is a party. In that regard, the Spanish Constitutional Court decided to
look at the case law of the ECtHR and to take due account of the ruling of the
ECJ in Melloni. It thus found, following the line adopted by the ECJ in
Melloni, that the Spanish Constitution does not prevent the Spanish judicial
authorities from consenting to surrender a person who has been convicted in
absentia, provided that the person concerned had, voluntarily and
unambiguously, waived his right to be present at his trial and was properly
represented at that trial by legal counsel. Hence, the EAW issued against Mr
Melloni – who was aware of the scheduled trial and had accordingly appointed
two trusted lawyers who represented him at the trial and in the subsequent
appeal and cassation proceedings – had to be executed by the Spanish judicial
authorities.
In Mr R v. Order of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, the German
Constitutional Court also endorsed the level of fundamental rights protection
provided for by the EAW Framework Decision, as interpreted by the ECJ in
Melloni.58 In that case, it was called upon to rule on a constitutional complaint
brought by a US citizen against an order of the Higher Regional Court of
Düsseldorf agreeing to the execution of an EAW issued by the Court ofAppeal
of Florence for the purpose of executing a 30-year custodial sentence. That
order was adopted despite the fact that the US citizen in question had been
convicted in absentia, had not been informed that the trial was taking place,
nor of its outcome, and that there was no certainty as to whether a retrial – in
which fresh evidence could be presented – would be granted in Italy.
With regard to persons convicted in absentia, the German Constitutional
Court held that the level of fundamental rights protection set out in the EAW
Framework Decision was consistent with the German Basic Law, in particular
with the principle of “individual guilt” (the “Schuldprinzip”), a constitutional
principle that forms part of Germany’s constitutional identity.59 Accordingly,
it found that there was no need to make a reference to the ECJ.60 The German
Constitutional Court held that such consistency exists because both the EAW
Framework Decision and the German implementing legislation contained
provisions that took account of the Schuldprinzip. As mentioned above, where
a person convicted in absentia has not voluntarily and unambiguously waived
his right to be present at the trial in the issuing Member State, the EAW
58. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate of 15 Dec. 2015, 2 BvR
2735/14, paras. 1–126. See Nowag, “EU law, constitutional identity, and human dignity:A toxic
mix? Bundesverfassungsgericht: Mr R”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 1441–1453.
59. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 2735/14, cited previous note, para 53.
60. Ibid., para 125.
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Framework Decision provides that execution of an EAW may be refused
unless a retrial takes place in the issuing Member State. In that regard, the
German Constitutional Court reasoned that the term “retrial”, within the
meaning of the Framework Decision interpreted in the light of the Charter,
means a full review in law and in fact: the competent court in the issuing
Member State must have no discretion regarding the admissibility of fresh
evidence that could exonerate a person convicted in absentia.61 Where such a
person has presented convincing arguments demonstrating that appeal
proceedings in the issuing Member State may be carried out in breach of the
Schuldprinzip because he or she will not be offered the possibility of
presenting fresh evidence, both the EAW Framework Decision and German
law impose on the German judicial authority the obligation to investigate
whether those arguments are well founded. If so, it must refrain from
executing such an EAW.62
The extent of the obligation to investigate the legal situation and actual
practice in the issuing Member State is to be determined in the light of both the
principle of mutual trust and the effective judicial protection of fundamental
rights. On the one hand, the principle of mutual trust militates against German
courts “always [having] to review the reasons [for a surrender] request in
detail”.63 On the other hand, compliance with the Schuldprinzip, Article 6 of
the ECHR and the principle of effective judicial protection enshrined in
Article 47 of the Charter prevents those courts from executing an EAW issued
against a person convicted in absentia who has not waived his right to be
present at the trial, where such a person is not provided with a real opportunity
to defend himself effectively in the issuing Member State, in particular by
presenting fresh evidence.64 Thus, the German Constitutional Court found
that the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf had failed to fulfil that
obligation to investigate since, far from ascertaining whether a hearing during
which fresh evidence could be presented would actually take place in Italy, it
limited itself to noting that such a hearing was “in any case not impossible”.65
In my view, two direct implications flow from Melloni and from the
respective rulings of the Spanish and German constitutional courts. First,
when interpreting and applying the Charter, the ECJ takes into account both
the case law of the ECtHR and the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States. Thus, in Melloni, the ECJ referred to the case law of
the ECtHR applying Article 6(1) and (3) of the ECHR when establishing the
61. Ibid., paras. 89–90.
62. Ibid. paras. 105, 108, and 110.
63. Ibid., paras. 67 and 111.
64. Ibid., paras. 60, 97 and 110.
65. Ibid., paras. 113 et seq.
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circumstances under which a person may waive his right to be present at the
trial.66 As those references show, the ECJ takes care to ensure that the EU level
of fundamental rights protection of persons convicted in absentia is consistent
with that provided for by the ECHR. Similarly, as the rulings of the Spanish
and German constitutional courts show, that level of protection also complies
with that provided for by the “core provisions” of national constitutions.
Second, the fact that the EAW Framework Decision complies with the Charter
does not mean that EAWs must always be executed automatically. The
executing judicial authorities are under an obligation to verify whether the
provisions of the EAW Framework Decision that strike a delicate balance
between the principle of mutual trust and the fundamental rights of the persons
who are the subject of an EAW are, in fact, applicable to the case at hand. If
they fail to do so, they run the risk of misapplying the EAW Framework
Decision, thus disturbing that delicate balance and, consequently, violating
both EU law and their own national constitutional law.
It therefore follows from the existence of EU legislation harmonizing the
level of fundamental rights protection that the executing Member State may
never impose its own domestic standards on the issuing Member State,67 as
this would call into question the premise that those two Member States are
equally capable of providing effective judicial protection of those rights. If it
has doubts as to the adequacy of the level of fundamental rights protection
provided for by the EAW Framework Decision as a matter of EU law, the
executing Member State must engage in a dialogue with the ECJ.
Furthermore, as discussed in more detail in the next section, a different,
albeit related, question that arises is whether the executing Member State may
postpone execution where it has solid, objective and up-to-date evidence
showing that the issuing Member State has not correctly implemented the
uniform level of fundamental rights protection set out in the EAW Framework
Decision. In the Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru judgment, the ECJ ruled that it may
do so but, because of the fundamental importance of mutual trust, only in
exceptional circumstances. This shows that mutual trust is not to be confused
with blind trust.68 That said, since the principle of mutual trust defines the
legal structure of the EU, any limitation on that principle may not give rise to
a constant state of mistrust between the Member States as this would lead to
66. See e.g. ECtHR, Medenica v. Switzerland; ECtHR, Sejdovic v. Italy, and ECtHR,
Haralampiev v. Bulgaria, all cited supra note 54.
67. See Anagnostaras, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1682.
68. Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru, EU:C:2016:198. See
Anagnostaras, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1683 (holding that “[t]he central message of the
preliminary ruling is that mutual confidence is not to be interpreted as blind trust, and that the
presumption that Member States observe the fundamental rights requirements is not actually
irrefutable”).
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the fragmentation of the AFSJ: limitations on that principle must remain
exceptional and, where applicable, must operate with a view to restoring trust
in the future, instead of destroying it forever. That is why the ECJ opted in that
judgment for postponing execution rather than denying it from the outset.
4. Mutual trust, mutual recognition and the national and European
public policy exceptions
Primary and secondary EU law may identify situations where the principle of
mutual recognition ceases to operate. I shall refer to that type of limitation as
the national and European public policy exceptions to mutual recognition.
4.1. The national public policy exception
In order to safeguard the essential features of the Member States’ civil and
criminal justice systems, the EU legislative institutions may define situations
where the principle of mutual recognition does not apply. Notably, they may
provide for grounds for non-recognition and/or non-execution where the free
movement of judgments may adversely affect delicate aspects of Member
State justice systems. In defining these grounds, the EU legislative institutions
seek to strike the right balance between the competing imperatives of effective
judicial cooperation and non-interference with the basic tenets of the Member
States’ civil and criminal law systems.69 Thus, those grounds are based on
national public policy considerations. I shall refer to them as the “national
public policy exception”.
In the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, the EU legislative
institutions have provided for a public policy exception to the recognition or
enforcement of judgments.70 In that regard, the ECJ has consistently held that
“while it is not for the [ECJ] to define the content of the public policy of a
Member State, it is none the less required to review the limits within which the
courts of a Member State may have recourse to that concept for the purpose of
refusing recognition to a judgment emanating from another Member State”.71
69. Janssens, op. cit. supra note 21, p. 203.
70. See e.g. Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (Brussels I Regulation) of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 12 Dec. 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. 2012, L 351/1, Arts. 45(1)(a)
and 46. See also Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency
proceedings, O.J. 2000, L 160/1, Art. 26.
71. See Case C-7/98, Krombach, EU:C:2000:164, para 23; Case C-38/98, Renault,
EU:C:2000:225, para 28; Case C-420/07, Apostolides, EU:C:2009:271, para 57 and Case
C-619/10, Trade Agency, EU:C:2012:531, para 49.
CML Rev. 2017822 Lenaerts
“Recourse to the public policy [exception] can be envisaged only where
recognition or enforcement of the judgment given in another Member
State would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order
of the State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it would infringe
a fundamental principle. The infringement would have to constitute a
manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of
the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being
fundamental within that legal order”.72
In particular, the ECJ has observed that the rights of the defence occupy a
prominent position in the organization and conduct of a fair trial and that they
are the fundamental rights deriving from the constitutional traditions common
to the Member States. Thus, the refusal to hear the defence of an accused
person who is not present at the hearing constitutes a manifest breach of
fundamental rights.73
Since the public policy exception constitutes an obstacle to the mutual
recognition of judgments, it may only apply under exceptional circumstances.
Yet, the very existence of that exception proves that mutual recognition of
judgments should not operate to the detriment of fundamental rights. In
particular, mutual trust among national courts cannot lead to a situation where
deference would be due to judicial decisions adopted in disregard of basic
procedural rights. Only when these rights have been sufficiently protected
will mutual trust prevent a court of Member State “A” from questioning the
jurisdiction of a court of Member State “B” on grounds of expediency, bad
faith of the applicant or of being in a better position to rule on the merits.
Otherwise, national courts might question each other’s capacity to examine
their own jurisdiction, leading to the fragmentation of the AFSJ.74 The same
applies in relation to the substantive law applied by the court of the Member
State having ruled on the merits of the case.
In the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, secondary EU law
often contains no explicit provision laying down a public policy exception.
That said, public policy considerations relating to the criminal justice systems
of the Member States were taken into account by the EU legislative
institutions. Non-execution grounds that relate to amnesty and immunity,
prescription, the age of criminal responsibility, judgments rendered in
72. See Case C-7/98, Krombach, para 37; Case C-38/98, Renault, para 30; Case C-420/07,
Apostolides, para 59 and Case C-619/10, Trade Agency, para 51.
73. Case C-7/98, Krombach, paras. 38–40.
74. Lenaerts, “The contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice”, 59 ICLQ (2010), 284–285.
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abstentia, and custodial life sentences, may be read as expressions of the
executing Member State’s public policy.75
4.2. The European public policy exception
Where secondary EU legislation does not provide for a national public policy
exception and the validity of such secondary legislation is upheld in the light
of the Charter, the question that arises is whether the executing Member State
may still rely on a European public policy exception in order to oppose
execution. This question relates to a possible exception to the second negative
obligation that derives from the normative content of the principle of mutual
trust,76 i.e. that the executing Member State may not, in principle, verify that
the issuing Member State (or Member State of origin) has actually, in a
specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU. In that
regard, the ECJ held, in its Opinion 2/13, that the executing Member State may
undertake such a verification, but only in “exceptional circumstances”. This
section aims to shed some light on that complex question by contrasting the
judgment of the ECJ inAguirre Zarragawith those inN.S.,C.K.,Aranyosi and
Ca˘lda˘raru.
4.2.1. In the absence of “exceptional circumstances”: Aguirre Zarraga
The national public policy exception enshrined in Article 23 of the Brussels II
a Regulation does not apply to proceedings concerning the non-return of a
child.77 Thus, the question that arose in Aguirre Zarraga was whether, in the
absence of any suggestion that the system of fundamental rights protection of
the Member State of origin is manifestly deficient, the Member State of
enforcement may nevertheless rely on the Charter in order to deny execution
of a judicial decision issued by the former Member State. The ECJ replied in
the negative.78
That case concerned the non-return of a child from Germany to Spain. The
German court asked, in essence, whether the certificate provided for by
Article 42 of the Brussels II a Regulation ordering the return of a child could
be disregarded by a court in the Member State of enforcement in
circumstances where its issue amounted, in its view, to a serious violation of
fundamental rights, notably Article 24 of the Charter (the child concerned was
not heard),79 or where that certificate contained a statement that was
75. Janssens, op. cit. supra note 21, pp. 204–205.
76. Opinion 2/13, para 192. See supra section 3.
77. See Brussels II a Regulation, cited supra note 20, Chapter III, Section 4.
78. Case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga, EU:C:2010:828.
79. Ibid., para 35.
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manifestly incorrect (it stated that the child was heard when in fact, she was
not).80 In particular, the referring court asked whether it could oppose the
enforcement of a judgment ordering the return of a child where – contrary to
what was, in its view, required by Article 42(2)(a) of the Brussels II a
Regulation – that child had not been given the opportunity to be heard.
After recalling its previous findings in Rinau and Povse,81 the ECJ held that
a court of the Member State of enforcement may not oppose the recognition of
a judgment certified pursuant to the requirements laid down in Article 42(2).
That being said, the ECJ pointed out that the fact that the court of the Member
State of enforcement lacks the powers to review a certified judgment adopted
in accordance with Article 42(2) does not mean that the fundamental rights of
the child concerned, notably his or her right to be heard, are deprived of
judicial protection. First, the system set up by the Brussels II a Regulation
rests on the principle of mutual trust. In the realm of fundamental rights, this
means that it is presumed that all national courts provide an equivalent and
effective level of judicial protection.82 Second, when issuing a certificate on
the basis of Article 42(2) of the Brussels II a Regulation, it is for the court of
the Member State of origin to make sure that the child is able to express her
views freely “in accordance with [her] age and maturity”. In particular, that
court must determine whether hearing the child is, in light of Article 24 of the
Charter, in his or her best interests.83 Third, it is “within the legal system of the
Member State of origin that the parties concerned must pursue legal remedies
which allow the lawfulness of a judgment certified pursuant to Article 42 of
[the Brussels II a Regulation] to be challenged”.84 The ECJ observed that
appeal proceedings had been brought in Spain.85
The approach followed by the ECJ in Aguirre Zarraga is fully consistent
with the rulings of the ECtHR in Povse v. Austria, and in M.A. v. Austria,
decided after the ECJ delivered its judgments in Rinau, Povse and Aguirre
Zarraga. The relevant facts of these cases involved the wrongful removal from
Italy of a four-year-old girl born to an Italian father, Mr MA, and an Austrian
mother, Ms Povse. The wrongful removal took place in February 2008, when
Ms Povse and her daughter left Italy — the Member State where the child was
habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal — to stay
permanently in Austria. In order to put an end to that wrongful removal, the
Italian courts ordered the return of the child. However, the Austrian courts
called into question the jurisdiction of their Italian counterparts. This was
80. Ibid., para 36.
81. Case C-195/08 PPU, Rinau and Case C-211/10 PPU, Povse, EU:C:2010:400.
82. Case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga, paras. 59 et seq.
83. Ibid., para 64.
84. Ibid., para 71.
85. Ibid., para 72.
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clarified through a preliminary reference made by the Austrian Supreme
Court to the ECJ, which held that Italian courts had retained jurisdiction under
the Brussels II a Regulation and could thus order the return of the child.86
Under that Regulation, it is for the courts of the Member State in which the
child had its habitual residence prior to the wrongful removal to decide
whether the return of the child is in her best interest.87 Consequently, the
Austrian courts enforced the Italian decision.
In Povse v. Austria,88 Ms Povse brought an action against Austria before the
ECtHR arguing that, in deciding to enforce the Italian decision, Austria had
violated her fundamental rights and those of her daughter. However, the
ECtHR took a different view. It held that the Bosphorus presumption applied
to the case at hand:89 since the Austrian courts “did not exercise any discretion
in ordering the enforcement of the return orders”, the ECtHR ruled that
“Austria [had] therefore done no more than fulfil the strict obligations flowing
from its membership of the European Union”,90 i.e. from the Brussels II a
Regulation. Referring to the ruling of the ECJ, the ECtHR found that the
Austrian courts had no choice but to enforce the decision of the Italian courts
ordering the return of the child, and concluded that Austria had violated
neither the fundamental rights of the child nor those of her mother. It noted
that “it [was] open to the applicants to rely on their Convention rights before
the Italian [c]ourts … Should any action before the Italian courts fail, the
applicants would ultimately be in a position to lodge an application with the
[ECtHR] against Italy”.91
Pursuing the same logic, in M.A. v. Austria which concerned the
fundamental rights of the father of the four-year-old girl, the ECtHR held that
by failing to act expeditiously and to take sufficient steps to ensure the
enforcement of his daughter’s return to Italy, Austria had violated his rights
under Article 8 of the ECHR.92 Povse v. Austria and M.A. v. Austria are two
86. Case C-211/10 PPU, Povse.
87. By deterring unlawful removals, the division of jurisdiction set out in the Brussels II a
Regulation protects the rights of the child as enshrined in Art. 24(3) of the Charter: “an
unlawful removal of the child, following the taking of a unilateral decision by one of the child’s
parents, more often than not deprives the child of the possibility of maintaining on a regular
basis a personal relationship and direct contact with the other parent”, which is a fundamental
right guaranteed by that provision of the Charter. Ibid., para 64 (referring to Case C-403/09
PPU, Deticˇek, EU:C:2009:810, para 56).
88. ECtHR, Povse v. Austria, Appl. No. 3890/11, decision of 18 June 2013.
89. ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava YollarıTurizm veTicaretAnonim S¸irketi v. Ireland, Appl. No.
45036/98, judgment of 30 June 2005.
90. ECtHR, Povse v. Austria, para 82.
91. Ibid., para 86.
92. ECtHR, M.A. v. Austria,Appl. No. 4097/13, judgment of 15 Jan. 2015.
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welcome developments that contribute to strengthening the principle of
mutual trust.
More recently, the ruling of the ECtHR in Avotin¸š v. Latvia appears to
suggest that that court is willing to recognize more generally the importance of
the principle of mutual trust.93 The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held, after
reaffirming that the Bosphorus presumption – as further developed in
Michaud v. France94 – remains good law, that it “is mindful of the importance
of the mutual recognition mechanisms for the construction of the [AFSJ]”.95
Accordingly, the adoption of the means necessary to achieve such
construction is, in principle, a wholly legitimate objective from the standpoint
of the Convention. As a matter of principle, the ECtHR endorsed the way in
which EU law allocates responsibilities between the Member State which is
competent for adopting the judicial decision in question and that responsible
for enforcing it: the national court that adopts the contested decision has the
primary responsibility for protecting the fundamental rights of the persons
affected by that decision, rather than the court enforcing it. Nevertheless, “[the
ECtHR] must verify that the principle of mutual recognition is not applied
automatically and mechanically … to the detriment of fundamental rights”.
As a result, where a serious and substantiated complaint is raised before the
court of the executing Member State to the effect that the protection of an
ECHR right has been manifestly deficient in the Member State of origin and
this situation cannot be remedied by EU law, theBosphorus presumption is set
aside and the ECtHR no longer refrains from examining whether the
execution of such decision entails a violation of the ECHR.96 As will be
93. ECtHR, Avotin¸š v. Latvia.
94. According to the ECtHR, for the Bosphorus presumption to apply, the two following
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the national authorities must not enjoy any margin of
manoeuvre. Second, “the full potential of the relevant international machinery for supervising
fundamental rights – in principle equivalent to that of the Convention – [has] been deployed”.
That full potential is not deployed where the national court against whose decisions there is no
judicial remedy under national law, fails to make a reference to the ECJ, “even though [the latter
court has] not had an opportunity to examine the question, either in a preliminary ruling
delivered in the context of another case, or on the occasion of [a direct action]”. See ECtHR,
Michaud v. France, Appl. No. 12323/11, judgment of 6 Dec. 2012, paras. 102–116. However,
“this second condition should be applied without excessive formalism and taking into account
the specific features of the supervisory mechanism in question … [It] would serve no useful
purpose to make the implementation of theBosphorus presumption subject to a requirement for
the domestic court to request a ruling from the [ECJ] in all cases without exception, including
those cases where no genuine and serious issue arises with regard to the protection of
fundamental rights by EU law, or those in which the [ECJ] has already stated precisely how the
applicable provisions of EU law should be interpreted in a manner compatible with
fundamental rights”. See ECtHR, Avotin¸š v. Latvia, para 109.
95. ECtHR, Avotin¸š v. Latvia, para 113.
96. Ibid., para 116.
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discussed below, the rationale underpinning Avotin¸š v. Latvia is consistent
with the interpretation of the principle of mutual trust endorsed by the ECJ in
N.S., C.K., and Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru.
4.2.2. In “exceptional circumstances”: N.S., C.K. and Aranyosi and
Ca˘lda˘raru
In the N.S. case, the ECJ was asked to interpret the concept of a “Member
State responsible” for examining an asylum application within the meaning of
Article 3(1) of the Dublin II Regulation.97 The facts of the case concerned six
asylum seekers who were, in application of the criterion of first entry laid
down in Article 10(1) of the Dublin II Regulation,98 to be transferred from the
Member States where they were present, i.e. the UK and Ireland, to Greece.
However, those asylum seekers challenged the transfer decision on the ground
that in Greece they would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or
degrading treatment. The ECJ began by stating that whilst the AFSJ is built on
the presumption that all Member States comply with fundamental rights, that
presumption is by no means irrebuttable.99 Next, in what is, in my view, the
most important passage of that judgment, it held that:
“[T]he Member States, including the national courts, may not transfer an
asylum seeker to the ‘Member State responsible’ within the meaning of
[the Dublin II Regulation] where they cannot be unaware that systemic
deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of
asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for
believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected
to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the
Charter.”100
Consequently, the Member State where the asylum seeker is present must
proceed to examine the other hierarchical criteria listed in the Dublin II
Regulation so as to determine the “Member State responsible”, provided that
such determination does not take an unreasonable length of time, which could
worsen the situation of the asylum seeker. If that determination is excessively
lengthy, the Member State where the asylum seeker is present must examine
his or her application under Article 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation.101 Thus,
if compliance with fundamental rights requires the Member State where the
97. Now Dublin III Regulation, Art. 3(1).
98. Now ibid., Art. 13(1).
99. Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S., para 81.
100. Ibid., para 94 (emphasis added).
101. Now Dublin III Regulation, Art. 17(1).
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asylum seeker is present to examine the asylum application, that Member
State has no choice but to do so.102
At this stage, one may make four observations in respect of the ruling of the
ECJ in N.S. First, it “constitutes a turning point in the evolution of interstate
cooperation in the [AFSJ]”, as it brings about the end of automaticity for the
system of mutual trust on which the Dublin II Regulation is based.103 National
authorities are indeed required to examine whether there are “systemic
deficiencies” in the “Member State responsible” that prevent them from
transferring the asylum seeker to that Member State.
Second, the rationale underpinning N.S. only applies in exceptional
circumstances: the notion of “systemic deficiencies” is to be distinguished
from a mere “infringement of a fundamental right by the Member State
responsible” which may not affect the obligations of the other Member States
to comply with the provisions of the Dublin II Regulation. Otherwise, the
principle of mutual trust would become devoid of purpose and substance,
leading to the fragmentation of the AFSJ itself. It is worth noting that Article
3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation codifies the N.S. judgment. Moreover, the
ECJ relied on the ruling of the ECtHR inM.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, a case
involving the transfer of an asylum seeker from Belgium to Greece,104 where
that court ruled that Belgium “had infringed Article 3 of the ECHR, first, by
exposing the applicant to the risks arising from the deficiencies in the asylum
procedure in Greece, since the Belgian authorities knew or ought to have
known that he had no guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously
examined by the Greek authorities and, second, by knowingly exposing him to
conditions of detention and living conditions that amounted to degrading
treatment”.105 The ECtHR found that the infringement of fundamental rights
described in that judgment was the result of a systemic deficiency in the
asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in
Greece.106 Notably, the ECJ referred to theM.S.S. judgment with respect to the
information that could be relevant to determining the existence of a systemic
deficiency.107
102. Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S., paras. 98 and 108. See also Case C-4/11, Puid,
EU:C:2013:740, para 35.
103. Mitsilegas, “The limits of mutual trust in Europe’s area of freedom, security and
justice: From automatic inter-state cooperation to the slow emergence of the individual”, 31
YEL (2012), 358. Bribosia and Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 19, at 485–487.
104. ECtHR,M.S.S. v.Belgium andGreece,Appl. No. 30696/09, judgment of 21 Jan. 2011.
105. Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S., para 88.
106. Ibid., para 89.
107. Ibid., para 90.
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Third, in Abdullahi,108 the ECJ ruled that an asylum seeker was only
entitled to challenge a decision to transfer him to the Member State
responsible under the Dublin II Regulation by pleading systemic deficiencies
in the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of asylum
seekers in that Member State, which provide substantial grounds for believing
that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.109 Unless
an asylum seeker submitted substantive evidence regarding the existence of
systemic deficiencies, he could not challenge the way in which the criteria for
determining the Member State responsible listed in the Dublin II Regulation
had been applied by the competent authority. Subsequently, inGhezelbash and
Karim,110 the question arose whether this was still the case for transfer
decisions adopted under the Dublin III Regulation. After examining the
general thrust of the developments in EU law that had taken place as a result
of the adoption of the Dublin III Regulation, the ECJ replied in the negative.
Whilst confirming the principles underlying the Dublin II Regulation, the
Dublin III Regulation is intended to make the necessary improvements, in the
light of experience, not only to the effectiveness of the Dublin system but also
to the protection afforded to applicants under that system, an objective which
is to be achieved, inter alia, by means of the judicial protection enjoyed by
asylum seekers. When adopting the new Dublin Regulation, the EU legislative
institutions had decided to involve asylum seekers in the process of
determining the Member State responsible, by introducing or enhancing
various rights and mechanisms. In particular, the Dublin III Regulation
obliges the Member States, first, to inform asylum seekers of the criteria for
determining responsibility, second, to provide them with an opportunity to
submit information relevant to the correct interpretation of those criteria and,
third, to give them the opportunity to request, within a reasonable period of
time, that a court or tribunal should suspend the implementation of the transfer
decision pending the outcome of his or her appeal and to have legal assistance
when challenging that decision. Moreover, the fact of enabling asylum seekers
to challenge the incorrect application of the criteria listed in the Dublin III
Regulation is consistent with the objectives pursued by that Regulation. Those
rights would be devoid of practical effects if they were not accompanied by a
right to challenge the incorrect application of the criteria listed in that
Regulation.
108. Case C-394/12, Abdullahi, EU:C:2013:813.
109. Ibid., para 60. See also Case C-4/11, Puid, para 30.
110. Case C-63/15,Ghezelbash, EU:C:2016:409, paras. 30–61 and Case C-155/15,Karim,
EU:C:2016:410, para 22.
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Fourth and last, some scholars have argued that the ruling of the ECtHR in
Tarakhel v. Switzerland,111 which predated Opinion 2/13 by a month, is
difficult to reconcile with the judgment of the ECJ in N.S.112 Before
addressing that argument, it is worth recalling the main findings of the ECtHR
in Tarakhel, a case that concerned the transfer of an Afghan family from
Switzerland to Italy in application of the criteria laid down in the Dublin II
Regulation.113 In the light of the reception conditions in Italy, the ECtHR
found that “the possibility that a significant number of asylum seekers … may
be left without accommodation or accommodated in overcrowded facilities
without any privacy, or even in insalubrious or violent conditions, [was] not
unfounded”.114 In that regard, it held that, since families with children were in
a particularly vulnerable situation, their placement in such facilities would
amount to a violation of Article 3 ECHR. Although the situation to which the
Tarakhel family would be exposed in Italy would not be as bad as that of
the asylum seekers in Greece that was examined by the ECtHR inM.S.S., the
ECtHR ruled, drawing on the ruling of the UK Supreme Court in EM,115 that
that factual difference did not exempt the State where the asylum seeker was
present – Switzerland in this case – from “carrying out a thorough and
individualized examination of [his or her situation] and from suspending
enforcement of the removal order should the risk of inhuman or degrading
treatment be established”.116 Accordingly, it was “incumbent on the Swiss
authorities to obtain assurances from their Italian counterparts that on their
arrival in Italy the applicants [would] be received in facilities and in conditions
adapted to the age of the children, and that the family [would] be kept
together”.117
Arguing that the judgment of the ECJ in N.S. does not cover violations of
fundamental rights which are not the result of a systemic deficiency in the
asylum procedure and reception conditions in a Member State, the scholars to
whom I previously referred posited that the principle of mutual trust is not
wholly compatible with the system of fundamental rights protection set out in
111. ECtHR, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 29217/12, judgment of 4 Nov. 2014.
112. Peers, op. cit. supra note 2, at 220; Spaventa, op. cit. supra note 2, at 50 and
Halberstam, op. cit. supra note 2, at 128 et seq.
113. Whilst Switzerland is not an EU Member State, the Dublin II (now Dublin III)
Regulation applies to it by virtue of an EU-Swiss international agreement.
114. Tarakhel v. Switzerland, cited supra note 111, para 120.
115. UK Supreme Court, EM (Eritrea) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
judgment of 19 Feb. 2014, [2014] UKSC 12.
116. ECtHR, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, cited supra note 111, para 104.
117. Ibid., para 120.
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the ECHR.118 However, that argument does not take into account the fact that
in N.S., the ECJ was not confronted with questions similar to those addressed
by the ECtHR in Tarakhel.119 The N.S. judgment neither confirms nor
undermines the rationale underpinning Tarakhel. Those two cases are simply
not appropriate for “case pairing”. Instead, one should read N.S. as a sign of
deference towards the ruling of the ECtHR in M.S.S, since the ECJ limited
itself to holding that, where a Member State’s asylum system suffers from
systemic deficiencies, an asylum seeker may not be transferred to that
Member State.120 The N.S. case simply did not require the ECJ to determine
the precise contours of the notion of “systemic deficiencies”,121 nor to address
the question whether Article 4 of the Charter may preclude the transfer of an
asylum seeker in a situation that does not involve systemic deficiencies. Those
questions were left for future cases to resolve.
In fact, the recent judgment of the ECJ inC.K. has now clarified some of the
questions that theN.S. judgment left open.122 That case involved the transfer of
Mrs C.K., a Syrian national, her partner and her baby from Slovenia to Croatia.
In application of the Dublin III Regulation and having obtained assurances
from the Croatian authorities that Mrs C.K. and her family would be properly
accommodated and would have access to healthcare, the Slovenian authorities
decided to proceed with their transfer. However, the applicants challenged that
decision on the ground that, as Mrs C.K. was suffering from serious mental
illness and was even a suicide risk, the transfer could adversely affect her state
of health and that of her baby. The case went all the way up to the Slovenian
Constitutional Court which remanded the matter to the Slovenian Supreme
Court, ordering that court to examine, in the light of the personal situation of
the applicants, whether the transfer of Mrs C.K. and her family could in itself
constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR.Accordingly, the Slovenian Supreme
Court made a reference to the ECJ asking, in essence, whether in the absence
of systemic deficiencies in the Member State responsible for examining the
asylum application, Article 4 of the Charter precludes the transfer of an
118. See e.g. Vicini, “The Dublin Regulation between Strasbourg and Luxembourg:
Reshaping non-refoulement in the name of mutual trust?”, 8European Journal of Legal Studies
(2015): 50–72.
119. See Koutrakos, “Editorial: ECJ, Strasbourg and national courts: An exercise in
guesswork”, 40 EL Rev. (2015): 641–642.
120. See Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S., para 94. Den Heijer, annotation of Joined
Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 49 CML Rev.
(2012), 1747.
121. See e.g. Lübbe, “‘Systemic flaws’ and Dublin transfers: Incompatible tests before the
CJEU and the ECtHR?”, 27 International Journal of Refugee Law (2015), 139. The same
conclusion can be drawn from Case C-394/12, Abdullahi. See, in this regard, Case C-578/16
PPU, C.K. and Others, EU:C:2017:127, para 94.
122. Case C-578/16 PPU, C.K.
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asylum seeker where such transfer would give rise to inhuman or degrading
treatment.
The ECJ replied in the affirmative. Drawing on its previous judgment in
Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru, it held that the prohibition set out in Article 4 of the
Charter is absolute and thus, any transfer under the Dublin III Regulation must
be carried out in such a way as to rule out a real and proven risk of the asylum
seeker’s being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.123 Where the
transfer of an asylum seeker who is suffering from a serious physical or mental
illness is damaging for her health, the ECJ found, drawing on the case law of
the ECtHR,124 that such transfer may constitute inhuman and degrading
treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.That said, it should be
emphasized that a low level of ill-treatment does not fall within the scope of
that provision of the Charter, given that, as the ECtHR held in Tarakhel
regarding Article 3 ECHR, “to fall within [that scope] the ill-treatment must
attain a minimum level of severity”.125 That is why the ECJ stressed the fact
that deterioration in the asylum seeker’s health must be significant and
irremediable.126
Next, the ECJ pointed out that it is for the requesting Member State to dispel
all serious doubts regarding any negative impact that the transfer may have on
the health of the asylum seeker.127 To that end, that Member State must, in
cooperation with the Member State responsible, take all the necessary
precautions provided for by the Dublin III Regulation to ensure that the
transfer takes place under conditions that properly and adequately safeguard
the health of the asylum seeker. Provided that is the case, the requesting
Member State may proceed with the transfer.128 Otherwise, that is, where
those precautions do not suffice to guarantee that the transfer will not worsen
the health of the asylum seeker, execution must be suspended until those
health considerations no longer militate against the transfer.129 In that regard,
where the health of the asylum seeker is not likely to improve in the short term,
the requesting Member State may decide to examine the asylum application
under Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.130 However, it is under no
123. Ibid., para 65.
124. Ibid., para 68. Referring to ECtHR, Paposhvili v. Belgium, Appl. No. 41738/10, paras.
174–175.
125. ECtHR, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, cited supra note 111, para 118.
126. Case C-578/16 PPU, C.K., para 74.
127. Ibid., paras. 75–76.
128. Ibid., para 84.
129. Ibid., para 85.
130. It is the so-called “discretionary clause”, a provision whose wording reproduces, in
essence, that of the “sovereign clause” set out in ex Art. 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation. See
Case C-578/16 PPU, C.K., para 53.
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obligation to do so.131 On the other hand, where the transfer has not taken place
because of health considerations within the six-month period set out in
Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, the requesting Member State
becomes the Member State responsible for examining the asylum
application.132
Most importantly for present purposes, the ECJ pointed out that Article
3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation – a provision that codifies the N.S. judgment
– is not to be interpreted as precluding the requesting Member State from
suspending the transfer of an asylum seeker in situations where there is a real
and proven risk that the prohibition set out in Article 4 of the Charter will be
breached, despite the fact that there are no systemic deficiencies in the
Member State responsible.133 That interpretation, the ECJ reasoned, is
compatible with the principle of mutual trust since, far from calling into
question the presumption of compliance with fundamental rights in every
Member State, it guarantees that the requesting Member State will take into
consideration exceptional situations such as that of Mrs C.K.134 Accordingly,
it follows from that judgment that there is in fact no normative conflict
between the judgment of the ECtHR in Tarakhel and the principle of mutual
trust as interpreted by the ECJ: the operation of that principle may never lead
to a violation of Article 4 of the Charter.
Finally, one should also take a closer look at the judgment of the ECJ in
Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru, a seminal judgment to which the C.K. judgment
makes extensive reference.135 Whilst it is true that this ruling did not concern
the Dublin System but the EAW Framework Decision,136 it raised the
analogous question whether the execution of an EAW could be suspended
where such execution would entail a real risk of inhuman or degrading
treatment whose origin was a deficiency in the prison system of the issuing
Member State that was systemic or generalized, or affected certain groups of
people, or certain places of detention. The ECJ held that the operation of the
principle of mutual trust may be limited where the execution of an EAW is
liable to give rise to breaches of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment enshrined in Article 4 of the Charter. That
might be the case, for example, where conditions of detention in the issuing
Member State do not comply with Article 4 of the Charter because the prison
131. Case C-578/16 PPU, C.K., para 88.
132. Ibid., para 89.
133. Ibid., paras. 92–93.
134. Ibid., para 95.
135. Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru.
136. See, in this regard, Opinion of A.G. Bot in Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU,
Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru, EU:C:2016:140, paras. 80 et seq.
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facilities where the person surrendered is likely to be incarcerated are
overpopulated or prison cells are too small.
The rationale behind this ruling is that, unlike the principle of mutual trust
and the fundamental rights that are not enshrined in Title I of the Charter, the
prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment may not be subject
to any limitations. That prohibition, which seeks to protect the very essence of
human dignity, is absolute. As a matter of fact, the ECtHR has held, in the
context of Article 3 ECHR, that no derogation from that prohibition is
allowed, not even in the fight against international terrorism and organized
crime.137
Here again, there was no need for the ECJ to address the further question
whether manifest and prima facie unjustified limitations on the exercise of
other fundamental rights might also lead to limit the operation of the principle
of mutual trust. Further case law will have to clarify this question, normally on
the occasion of preliminary references made to the ECJ.
In order to balance the principle of mutual trust and the exception to its
operation in a well-defined set of circumstances, the ECJ set out a two-step
analysis that the executing judicial authority is to follow when determining
whether the execution of an EAW would, in the light of the conditions of
detention in the issuing Member State, breach the prohibition set out in
Article 4 of the Charter.
First, the executing judicial authority must determine whether there is a real
risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals detained in the issuing
Member State. That determination must be grounded in information that is
objective, reliable, specific and properly updated concerning conditions of
detention in the issuing Member State. Such a risk may only be said to exist
where that information demonstrates that there are deficiencies, which may be
systemic or generalized, or which may affect certain groups of people, or
which may affect certain places of detention. As it had done in the N.S. case,
the ECJ held that such information may be taken from judgments of
international courts, notably rulings of the ECtHR, reports and other official
documents produced by international organizations such as the Council of
Europe or the UN, as well as judgments delivered by the courts of the issuing
Member States themselves.138
Second, the executing judicial authority must carry out a concrete and
precise assessment of the circumstances in the particular case at hand. This
means, in essence, that it must verify whether there are substantial grounds to
believe that the execution of the EAW at issue would entail a real risk that the
prohibition enshrined in Article 4 of the Charter might actually be breached in
137. Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru, paras. 85–87.
138. Ibid., para 89.
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practice in respect of the individual concerned. That further assessment is
warranted because the existence of deficiencies in the prison system of the
issuing Member State generally does not necessarily exclude the possibility
that the competent authorities of that Member State may still be able to show
that the person who is the subject of the EAW will not, in fact, be exposed to
inhuman or degrading treatment.139 To that effect, the executing judicial
authority must have recourse to the cooperation mechanism laid down in the
EAW Framework Decision which provides the competent authorities of the
issuing Member State with an opportunity to prove that the person concerned
will be detained in conditions which do not subject him or her to inhuman or
degrading treatment.140
Where, notwithstanding that additional information, the executing judicial
authority still believes that the execution of the EAW at issue would give rise
to a real risk that the prohibition enshrined in Article 4 of the Charter might be
breached, then that judicial authority must postpone, rather than abandon,
such execution.141 Postponing an EAW’s execution in such circumstances
ensures compliance with Article 4 of the Charter, whilst preserving the
effectiveness of the system of mutual recognition set out in the EAW
Framework Decision. Indeed, postponing an EAW’s execution provides the
issuing Member State with a new opportunity to regain the trust of the
executing judicial authority, thus avoiding a permanent state of mistrust
between two Member States’ judicial authorities.
That said, where the person who is the subject of the EAW at issue is
provisionally detained in the executing Member State, such detention may not
last indefinitely, but must comply with the Charter, in particular with the
presumption of innocence and the principle of proportionality. If the Charter
militates against that person’s provisional detention, the executing Member
State must nevertheless adopt alternative measures to prevent that person from
absconding and to ensure that the material conditions necessary for his or her
effective surrender continue to be fulfilled for as long as no final decision on
the execution of the EAW has been taken.142 Needless to say, if the existence
of a real risk of violating the prohibition enshrined in Article 4 of the Charter
cannot be discounted within a reasonable time, the executing judicial
authority must decide whether the surrender procedure should be brought to
an end.143
139. Ibid., paras. 93–94.
140. Ibid., para 95.
141. Ibid., para 98 (referring to Case C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan, para 38).
142. Joined Cases C-404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru, paras. 101–102.
143. Ibid., para 104.
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The Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru judgment shows that the ECJ strives to strike
the correct balance between the principle of mutual trust and the protection of
fundamental rights.144 It signals to national courts that the principle of mutual
trust may be subject to limitations, and that it is the primary responsibility of
the issuing Member State, or Member Sate of origin, to guarantee compliance
with fundamental rights so as to be worthy of the trust placed in it by the other
Member States. Mutual trust must indeed be earned by all Member States, as
equals in their commitment to upholding the EU fundamental rights
standards.
As regards the ECtHR, it gives impetus to the approach followed by that
court in cases such as Stapleton v. Ireland and Habib Ignaoua and Others v.
the UK,145 where it dismissed as inadmissible the applications brought against
the executing Member State by persons who were subject to an EAW. In
Stapleton, the ECtHR held that, in the absence of substantial grounds for
believing that there would be a real risk of the applicant being exposed to a
flagrant denial of a fair trial in the issuing Member State, it was for the courts
of that Member State to provide the applicant with effective judicial protection
of his fundamental rights as recognized by the ECHR.146 This was because the
issuing Member State, i.e. the UK, was a Contracting Party to the ECHR and,
as such, “[had] undertaken to abide by its Convention obligations and to
secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
therein”.147 Similarly, in Ignaoua, the ECtHR ruled that “the mutual trust and
confidence underpinning measures of police and judicial cooperation among
EU [M]ember States must be accorded some weight”,148 since that principle
“reflects the Court’s own general assumption that the Contracting States of the
Council of Europe will respect their international law obligations”.149
4.3. Public policy convergence
In N.S., C.K. and Aranyosi and Ca˘lda˘raru, the ECJ examined the existence of
a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment by reference
to the rights enshrined in Article 4 of the Charter, and not as a matter of
national public policy. Those two judgments can thus be seen as an expression
of European public policy that limits the principle of mutual trust.
144. Bribosia and Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 19, at 507.
145. ECtHR, Stapleton v. Ireland, Appl. No. 56588/07, decision of 4 May 2010 and
ECtHR, Habib Ignaoua and Others v. the UK, Appl. No. 46706/08, decision of 18 Mar. 2014.
146. See, in this regard, Bribosia and Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 19, at 496.
147. ECtHR, Stapleton v. Ireland, cited supra note 145, para 26.
148. ECtHR, Habib Ignaoua and Others v. the UK, para 55.
149. Ibid.
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In light of Krombach150 and the case law that followed it, the notion of
“national public policy” is “circumscribed” by both the principle of mutual
trust and the Charter.151 This means, in essence, that national public policy
must be consistent with European public policy, understood as a core nucleus
of values with which all Member States must comply. EU fundamental rights
protection stands centre stage in this core nucleus. Upholding that protection
is essential in its own right, but it also operates as the ultimate guarantee of the
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.
5. Concluding remarks
In summary, the principle of mutual trust is a constitutional principle that
pervades the entire AFSJ. It is only by sharing the same founding values of
democracy, pluralism, respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights that
EU citizens may move freely and securely in an area without internal frontiers.
It is said that “[t]rust takes years to build, seconds to destroy and forever to
repair”. That is why both the EU political institutions and the Member States
must be pro-active in strengthening mutual trust between national authorities,
in particular, national judiciaries.This means that EU legislative measures that
facilitate the application of the principle of mutual recognition must be
accompanied by “trust-enhancing legislation”.
The successful operation of the principle of mutual trust and the effective
judicial protection of fundamental rights require the national courts, the
ECtHR and the ECJ to engage in a constructive dialogue.
National courts, and in particular national supreme and constitutional
courts, must ensure that EU legislation which gives concrete expression to the
principle of mutual trust in organizing the conditions of mutual recognition
and enforcement, is properly applied. In so doing, as the ruling of the German
Constitutional Court inMrC. v.Order of the Kammergericht illustrates,152 the
executing judicial authority must refrain from imposing on the basis of its own
national law the fundamental rights standards prescribed by that law. Only in
“exceptional circumstances” may it second-guess whether the issuing judicial
authority has complied with the level of protection provided for by EU law.
Beyond that, it must accept the logic underlying the system of fundamental
rights protection in the issuing Member State, even where it differs from its
own. Furthermore, as the ruling of the German Constitutional Court inMr R
150. Case C-7/98, Krombach.
151. See, in this regard, Case C-681/13, Diageo Brands, EU:C:2015:471 and Bribosia and
Weyembergh, op. cit. supra note 19, at 506.
152. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 890/16, cited supra note 11.
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v. Order of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf shows,153 an incorrect
application of the EAW Framework Decision may upset the delicate balance
that the EU legislative institutions struck between ensuring the effectiveness
of the principle of mutual trust and respect for the fundamental rights of the
person who is the subject of an EAW as recognized by the Charter.154 Such
incorrect application may give rise to breaches of EU law, of national
constitutional law and of the ECHR. Thus, just as national courts trust the ECJ
to say what the law of the EU is, the ECJ trusts national supreme and
constitutional courts to monitor the correct application of that law.
For its part, the ECtHR is a valuable ally for the executing judicial
authorities in identifying the existence of a real risk of violating the
prohibition enshrined in Article 4 of the Charter, since that provision
corresponds to Article 3 ECHR. The case law of that court not only provides
useful guidance as to the content that should be given to Article 4 of the
Charter, but is also a valuable source of information with regard to the actual
existence of deficiencies in the level of fundamental rights protection ensured
by the issuing Member State. No one will be able to argue that the executing
judicial authority has made its ruling on the basis of national bias, if its
findings rely on the impartial authority with which judgments of the ECtHR
are invested.
Cases such as Povse v. Austria, Avotin¸š v. Latvia and Stapleton v. Ireland
suggest that the ECtHR is willing to recognize the importance of the principle
of mutual trust. It thus agreed that, in the light of that principle, the national
court that adopts the contested decision has the primary responsibility for
protecting the fundamental rights of the persons affected by it, rather than the
court that is later called upon to enforce it. However, where a serious and
substantiated complaint is raised before the courts of the executing Member
State to the effect that the protection of an ECHR right has been manifestly
deficient in the issuing Member State (or the Member State of origin) and this
situation cannot be remedied by EU law, that court may not refrain from
examining whether the execution of such decision entails a violation of the
ECHR. As regards Article 4 of the Charter, those findings are, in my view,
fully consistent with the line of case law developed in N.S., C.K. and Aranyosi
and Ca˘lda˘raru.
Last but not least, it is the task of the ECJ to make sure that the balance that
the EU legislative institutions have struck between the principle of mutual
trust and the protection of fundamental rights complies with primary EU law,
and in particular with the Charter. In so doing, the ECJ draws inspiration from
the case law of the ECtHR and from the constitutional traditions common to
153. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 2735/14, cited supra note 58.
154. See Case C-496/16, Aranyosi II (pending).
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the Member States, especially when determining the content of the
fundamental rights recognized in the Charter. That openness, on the part of the
ECJ, to the views of national courts and the ECtHR, not only makes possible
cross-fertilization of ideas between those judicial actors, but also serves to
prevent normative conflicts from arising.
Most importantly, in the aftermath of Opinion 2/13, the fact that the
principle of mutual trust may, in exceptional circumstances, effectively be
subject to limitations should reassure all those who fear that the ECJ might
give too much weight to the principle of mutual trust at the expense of the
protection of fundamental rights. Indeed, the ECJ has made it crystal clear that
mutual trust is not to be confused with blind trust. Trust must be “earned” by
the Member State of origin through effective compliance with EU
fundamental rights standards. But, where EU legislation complies with the
Charter, limitations on the principle of mutual trust must remain exceptional
and should operate in such a way as to restore mutual trust, thus solidifying all
at once the protection of fundamental rights and mutual trust as the
cornerstone of the AFSJ.
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